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Abstract: The 2012 reform of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code may be taken
as evidence that a new democratic openness has pervaded Chinese political and
social life. The protection of individual rights was improved. On the other hand,
traditional powers of the police were retained and sometimes extended. This
article will offer critical comments on some of the most important changes the
2012 reform brought. At the same time, the article will indicate alternative solu-
tions that can be found in other countries and that might serve as a model for
further changes of the Chinese system. The following problems will be discussed:
– The exclusionary rules that were added to the Code suffer from several short-
comings.
– The newly introduced privilege against self-incrimination is irreconcilable
with the traditional duty of the suspect to tell the truth.
– To retain the prosecutor’s power to decide on arrest is hardly in line with
international law and the law of other countries.
– The new residential confinement at a “designated residence”must be consid-
ered unsupervised police custody – an official measure that does not exist
anywhere else.
– General wide and uncontrolled investigatory powers of the police would have
needed restriction.
As criminal justice systems must be considered living organisms that develop in
dynamic ways, there is hope that problems left by the 2012 revision will be solved
by future reforms.
I. Introduction
Criminal procedure codes work like seismographs because they register how
certain provisions are affected by the political and social structure of a country. In
authoritarian states of the past, needles of seismographs remained rather static.
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Crime control and protection of the existing political system were typically given
top priority; suspects and accused were considered subordinates who had to
accept what was imposed by higher authorities. Only in relatively recent times,
the tectonic plates of political and social life started moving in the majority of
countries. It happened as a consequence of new philosophical and political ideas
that were developed on national and international levels.
Today, effectiveness and efficiency of criminal justice systems are balanced
with principles of fairness and due process as well as the requirement that
individual rights must be protected. The individual has become, and, to some
extent, still is in the process of becoming, a free and autonomous citizen who
plays an active role in public life and, consequently, also in criminal proceedings.
Seismographs today tend to oscillate between the traditional and new purposes
that criminal justice serves – protecting society through efficient law enforcement
and insulating the suspect and accused against arbitrariness and undue exercise
of power by investigating and adjudicating authorities.
A general reform of a criminal procedure code may be taken as evidence that
a major political earthquake occurred. The decisive question of a reform is what
political forces have influenced the dancing of the seismograph’s needle. In
which way has the legislature decided to rebalance traditional values of author-
itarian crime control with new, liberal ideas of due process and the safeguarding
of individual freedom? Provisions where this is best visible are those that define
the requirements for detention and arrest, search, seizure and the use of technical
means, because these measures must be considered most severe, and therefore
most problematic, invasions of individual liberty. Other important questions are
to what extent the power of investigating authorities is restricted with the help of
an exclusionary rule and in which cases the suspect can bring a complaint against
invasions of his or her privacy.
The Chinese Criminal Procedure Code has followed the general development
of criminal justice systems in other countries, but for historical reasons earth-
quakes in China occurred with some delay. The main, if not sole, purpose of the
original Chinese Code, which was enacted in 1979, was to provide for effective
crime control. The Code was, as Article 1 stated, an expression of the “dictatorship
of the proletariat” serving “to attack the enemy and protect the people.” The first
revision of the Code, which occurred in 1996, took some careful steps towards
modernizing Chinese criminal justice. From a comparative law point of view,
protection of individual rights was, however, not one of its main objectives. The
position of the suspect and accused was improved only to a limited extent.
This was different from the 2012 reform, which brought fundamental changes.
The 2012 revision may be taken as evidence of a rapid and dynamic development
that in recent years has affected Chinese political, social and economic life. At the
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same time, ideas of placing more emphasis on individual rights and rebalancing
the relationship between the individual and government have developed among
Chinese citizens. The preparation of the reform took place in an atmosphere of
democratic openness. Before the new law was enacted, a draft was published and
widely discussed not only by officials but also in private circles. On the Internet, a
number of Chinese and foreign authors criticized several changes proposed by the
draft.
The new democratic atmosphere became a fertile ground for the far-reaching
2012 reform of the Criminal Procedure Code, which was unprecedented in the
history of the People’s Republic. The reform was obviously influenced by a
political will and a public consensus to shift the weight of criminal justice
administration from exclusive crime control towards placing increasing emphasis
on ideas of fairness and protecting individual rights. This new policy is evident in
a clause that was added to Article 2 of the Criminal Procedure Code1. The provi-
sion, which so far has only relied on crime control, now also requires “respecting
and protecting human rights”2.
The following chapters will offer critical comments on important changes
brought by the 2012 reform. Criticism will, to some extent, also include what was
not but should have been changed. Comments will refer to the laws of other
countries when the reference may seem helpful to explain problems and short-
comings of the Chinese reform.
II. Comments on the Reform of Individual Articles
1. Exclusionary Rules (Article 54)
a) Article 54 (1) (1) – An Exclusionary Rule that is Too Wide
The introduction of exclusionary rules by Article 54 (1) of the Criminal Procedure
Code may be considered a clear sign that the Chinese legislature wished the new
general clause of Article 2 on respecting and protecting human rights to be taken
seriously. Article 54 provides for two different exclusionary rules. With respect to
confessions of the suspect or accused, a categorical exclusionary rule was intro-
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1 If not otherwise indicated, the number of a specific article refers to the version of the Code that
became effective on January 1, 2013.
2 This change obviously followed a revision of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China.
In 2004, Art. 33 of the Constitution was amended by a sentence providing that “the Nation
respects and protects human rights.”
duced. The first sentence of Article 54 stipulates that a confession obtained by
torture or “illegal means” must, without exception, be excluded. The exclusion-
ary rule found in the second sentence of Article 54 (1) may be considered relative
because it provides that physical and documentary evidence must be excluded
only if it is gathered in a way that “may seriously affect justice.”
The exclusion of confessions extorted from the suspect or accused by torture
brings Chinese law in line with the UN Convention against Torture3 as well as the
law of other countries4. Upon a closer view it appears, however, that the exclusion-
ary rule introduced by Article 54 (1) (1) is too broad. It provides without exception
for the exclusion of statements that were obtained by any “illegal means.” Arti-
cles 51 (1) and 181 of the Criminal Procedure Rules for Public Security Organs in
Dealingwith Criminal Cases, whichwere promulgated in 1998, are somewhatmore
specific because they prohibit collecting evidence with the help of torture, threats,
temptation and fraud. In addition, the Rules also refer to “other illegal means.”
As already mentioned in my Report on the Draft to Amend the Criminal
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China, it must be asked how such
“illegal means” clause providing for a categorical, wholesale exclusion will work
in practice5. A statement will, for example, have to be excluded in a case where
the police officer who conducted the interrogation produced no credentials and
thus neglected Article 117 (1). Likewise, a statement will not be admissible, if the
suspect or accused was not, as required by Article 118 (2), informed that a confes-
sion may be taken as a reason for imposing a lighter sentence. The question is
whether the exclusion of evidence would, in such cases, be necessary to protect
the suspect’s or accused’s rights. As Chinese defense counsel will not know what
will be covered by the new “illegal means” clause they might feel compelled to
bring various motions requesting that a statement of the suspect or accused be
excluded because it was obtained by illegal means.
Rules requiring categorical exclusion of illegally obtained evidence are not
only found in China but also in other countries. The truth is, however, that in other
legal systems they are often not fully enforced. Three examples will be given here
to explain howwholesale exclusionary rules have been restricted in differentways.
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3 Art. 15 of the Convention reads: “Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is
established to have been made as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence…”. The
Convention was ratified by the People’s Republic of China in 1988.
4 See § 136 a German Criminal Procedure Code. As to American law, see LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr,
Criminal Procedure, § 6.2, 5th ed. St. Paul 2009.
5 Herrmann, Report on the Draft to Amend the Criminal Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China, Journal of Comparative Law 2012, No. 1, 155; Procedural Law & Judicial System 2012,
No. 5, 66.
In Russia, not only the Criminal Procedure Code but also the Constitution of
the Russian Federation contains categorical exclusionary rules6. Experts on Rus-
sian law report, however, that Russian criminal justice authorities are still influ-
enced by the authoritarian ghosts of the lawless past. They often simply disregard
the legal and constitutional requirements by admitting illegally obtained evi-
dence on a more or less regular basis7.
The Corte Suprema di Cassazione, the highest Italian appellate court, has
taken a peculiar approach to restrict the categorical exclusionary rule contained in
Article 191 of the Italian Criminal Procedure Code. In a drug case where a dwelling
was searched the Court held that even though the search was illegal, the cocaine
found and seized could still be used as evidence at the trial. The Court separated
search and seizure in an artificial manner. It reasoned that the search was finished
with the discovery of the drugs. The seizure was, therefore, independent of the
illegal search and thus, the cocaine was considered admissible evidence. In
addition, the Court referred to Article 253 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code,
which requires the police to seize fruits of the crime. This legal obligation should
be given priority over the exclusionary rule8.
The United States Supreme Court has taken more rational approaches when
restricting categorical exclusionary rules. The Court did not have to face the same
difficulties as the Italian Cassation Court because it worked within the American
case law system and was, therefore, not bound by a statutory provision. The
Supreme Court held, for example, in Mapp v. Ohio, a landmark decision of 1961
that evidence found in a home must without exception be excluded if the search
was illegal9. The main reason for the exclusionary rule was to deter the police
from invading the constitutionally protected rights of the individual. In 1984,
however, the Supreme Court turned this categorical protection into a relative
exclusionary rule by introducing a good faith exception10. If police officers who
conduct a search did not know they were relying on an invalid search warrant,
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6 Criminal Procedure Code of the Russian Federation Arts. 7 (3) and 75; Constitution of the
Russian Federation Art. 50 (2): “In the administration of justice no evidence obtained in violation
of the federal law shall be allowed.”
7 See, for example, Newcombe, Russia, in: Bradley, Criminal Procedure – A Worldwide Study,
397 ff. at 437, 2nd ed. Durham 2007; Thaman, The Nullification of the Russian Jury: Lessons for
Jury-Inspired Reform in Eurasia and Beyond, 40 Cornell Intl. L. J. 355 ff. at 375–377 (2007);
Pomorski, Justice in Siberia: A Case Study of a Lower Criminal Court in the City of Krasnoyarsk,
Communist and Post-Communist Studies 34, 447 ff. (2001).
8 Decision of the Court of Cassation, Giustizia Penale 1997, 138. See also Decision of the same
Court, Giustizia Penale 1995, 368.
9 367 US 643.
10 United States v. Leon, 468 US 897 (1984).
they acted in good faith and thus did not need to be deterred by an exclusionary
rule. As a consequence, evidence found by the police officers was held admissi-
ble.
Chinese criminal justice authorities will have to develop their own technique
of working with the exclusionary rule of Article 54 (1) (1). If they come to the
conclusion that it cannot be applied without exception, they must find a way of
transforming the categorical into a variation of the relative exclusionary rule. As
pointed out before, a possible solution is offered by Article 54 (1) (2). Under this
provision, evidence must only be excluded if its use would “seriously obstruct
justice”11. According to this clause there can be no question that evidence
procured by torture must always be excluded. It will, however, be necessary to
develop a definition of what will be included in the concept of torture12. With
respect to the exclusion of other evidence, Spanish law could help explain what
may be considered a “serious obstruction of justice.” Article 238 (3) of the Spanish
Organic Law on Judicial Power provides that the collection of evidence is null and
void if essential procedural provisions are disregarded and thus rights of the
defence have actually been compromised13.
There are two other problems that were left open by the new Article 54 (1) (1).
One important question is whether illegally obtained evidence will be admissible
as soon as the suspect or accused consents to its use. To admit evidence in such
cases could easily be taken by criminal justice authorities as an invitation to
procure consent with various kinds of pressure. Under German law, this possibi-
lity is excluded because the German Criminal Procedure Code provides that an
illegally obtained statement of the suspect is inadmissible even if the suspect
consents to its use14.
On the other hand, Article 54 (1) (1) does not address the question of
whether and to what extent the exclusionary rule will apply to derivative
evidence, for instance, fruits of the poisonous tree. Experience teaches that the
exclusion of evidence directly obtained by illegal means is often only of sym-
bolic value if additional evidence derived from such evidence is admissible. To
take care of this problem, the Spanish Organic Law on Judicial Power provides
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11 Seemy Report on the Draft, above footnote 5.
12 For a clear definition, see UN Convention against Torture, Art. 1.
13 In the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Art. 24 (2), an even more detailed provision
can be found: Evidence that was “obtained in a manner that infringed or denied any rights or
freedoms guaranteed by this Charter,… shall be excluded if it is established that, having regard to
all the circumstances, the admission of it in the proceedings would bring the administration of
justice into disrepute.”
14 Sec. 136 a (3).
for the exclusion of evidence “obtained directly or indirectly in violation of
fundamental rights…”15.
These gaps left by the Chinese legislature in Article 54 (1) (1) of the Code need
to be closed. It may be expected that the Supreme Court of the People’s Republic
will try to solve some of the problems. On the other hand, it must be noted that
the “other illegal means” clause contained in the Chinese Code could only be
abrogated by the legislature which enacted it.
b) Article 54 (1) (2) – An Exclusionary Rule of Mainly Symbolic Character
Article 54 (1) (2) refers to physical and documentary evidence that is not gathered
under “legal procedure.” Articles 134 ff. of the Criminal Procedure Code are the
relevant “statutory” provisions for searches. Article 136 (1) provides that a search
warrant must be shown to the person to be searched. There is, however, no
provision in the Code or in any other statute stating who is authorized to issue a
search warrant, under what conditions a search warrant may be issued and in
which way a search may be conducted. No distinction is made between a search
of the suspect and of other persons. According to Article 136 (2), a search without
a warrant may be conducted incident to an arrest and under exigent circum-
stances, but the provision does, again, not define what the requirements for such
searches are. Article 205 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure for Public Security
Organs in Dealing with Criminal Cases provides that searches must be authorized
by a higher officer of the police force, but otherwise the Rules do not restrict the
power to search in any way. In a similar way, the Rules of Criminal Procedure for
the People’s Procurate do not contain any restrictions for searches.
This omission of any statutory or other guidance leaves Chinese police with
wide discretion concerningwhen and inwhichway to conduct a search. The police
are, for example, free to search aprivate residence at any timeduring thenight even
though Article 39 (1) of the Chinese Constitution declares residences to be “inviol-
able.” The police are also not prohibited from conducting extended searches of
offices andbusinesspremises thatmay last for days; thus, theoffice orbusiness can
no longer function and innocent employees will lose their job. As there are no legal
restrictions that the police could disobey, the exclusionary rule of Article 54 (1) (2)
will remain a largely ineffective sanction. At the same time, Article 39 (2) of the
Constitution, which prohibits the “unlawful search of … a citizen’s residence,” is
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15 Art. 11 (1). In a similar way, indirect evidence is excluded under Art. 23 of the Criminal
Procedure Code of Colombia.
reduced to an empty phrase because there is hardly a possibility for the police to
conduct an unlawful search under Article 136 of the Code.
Similar problems exist as to the seizure and impounding of objects and docu-
ments because Articles 139 ff. of the Code do not state under what conditions these
measures can be taken. Furthermore, the just mentioned Rules of the Public
SecurityOrgans are silent as to this issue.Aspolice officers conducting a seizure are
not restricted by any legal provision, their activities are governed exclusively by
considerations of efficiency. Police officers often do not knowwhich objectswill be
needed as evidence at the trial, so theymaybe tempted to seizemore thanwould be
necessary in the individual case. This will pose special problems in cases involving
the seizure of mail because the practice violates Article 40 (1) of the Chinese
Constitution, which guarantees the “freedom and privacy of correspondence”.
Articles 148 ff. of the Code on “technical investigation measures” deserve still
more severe criticism because the drafters fail to define what kinds of measures
the police are authorized to take. It is no secret that police today conduct
investigations with a great variety of technical measures, which may involve
considerably deeper intrusions of privacy than traditional search and seizure.
Typical measures are wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping, different types
of computer assisted investigation and the use of global-positioning systems to
track suspects.
Article 148 (1) seems to restrict the use of technical measures because it
authorizes such measures only for the investigation of a number of crimes that are
listed in the provision. The list includes, however, “crimes seriously endangering
the society.” This clause is obviously broad enough to include almost any crime,
especially if one keeps in mind that in the past, political campaigns to “crack
down on crime” have defined individual cases as a general danger to society.
Thus, it can hardly be expected that the crimes listed in Article 148 (1) will have
any limiting effect.
Article 148 (1) refers to “strict approval formalities” that are required to
authorize technical investigation measures. It is, however, left open who is in
charge of the approval procedure and under what conditions which measure can
be authorized. As far as could be ascertained, it has up to now been the job of the
head of the local police force to approve technical measures. If this practice is not
going to change under the new law, there will still be the problem that police
officers are in charge of approving what other police officers plan to do. This can
hardly be considered an effective procedure to control the police and protect
privacy.
As the chapter on technical investigation measures fails to offer any relevant
legal restriction of police activities, it must be expected that the exclusionary rule
of Article 54 (1) (2) will scarcely play an important role in Chinese practice.
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It should be mentioned in this context that the United States Supreme Court
has with the help of exclusionary rules systematically expanded the protection of
individual rights and thus created a general system of balancing the traditional
exercise of state power with modern respect of privacy16. In Germany, courts have
also taken exclusionary rules as a vehicle for improving the protection of indivi-
dual rights17.
2. Interrogation of the Suspect – A Clash of New and Old Law
As to the interrogation of the suspect, the 2012 reform gives rise to considerable
confusion. Two tectonic plates representing essential differences in official policy
seem to have moved against each other leaving deep cracks in the law. On the one
hand, a new clause was added to Article 50 of the Criminal Procedure Code
providing that no one shall be forced to incriminate himself or herself. As a
consequence, Chinese law now seems to be in line with the UN Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which was signed but not yet ratified by the People’s Repub-
lic18. On the other hand, Article 118 (1) of the old law requiring the suspect to
answer questions of the police truthfully was not abolished by the reform. There
can be no doubt that the two contradictory provisions can never be reconciled.
As far as could be ascertained, the duty of the suspect to tell the truth was
first introduced in the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code of 1979. At that time the
after-effects of the Cultural Revolution were still influencing political life in China,
individuals were subordinates oppressed by Party and government, and a strictly
enforced inquisitorial principle dominated criminal justice administration. The
suspect was considered an enemy of the people who must be brought under
control. People who were willing to oppose the official policy hardly dared to
raise their voice. The 1996 reform of the Criminal Procedure Code did not touch
the requirement to tell the truth even though the political landscape had changed
by that time.
When the 2012 reform was being prepared there was a general dispute over
whether the duty to tell the truth should not be replaced by the privilege against
self-incrimination. Some Chinese scholars and lawyers recommended giving
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16 As to details of this development see LaFave/Israel/King/Kerr (footnote 4), at chapters 3–6;
Bradley, United States, in: Bradley, Criminal Procedure – AWorldwide Study, 519 ff., at 526 ff., 2nd
ed. DurhamNC 2007.
17 Weigend, Germany, in: Bradley (footnote 16), 243 ff., at 248 ff.; Feeney/Herrmann, One Case –
Two Systems, Ardsley NY 2005, 242 f., 364, 369, New York 2005.
18 Art. 14 (3) (g) of the Covenant.
priority to the privilege. Practitioners, however, above all representatives of the
police, considered the suspect’s duty to tell the truth to be indispensable for
effective crime control19. In the end, practitioners won the argument. This may be
taken as a symbol that some of the old inquisitorial ideas are lingering still today
in spite of the general changes in the political life. Also the teaching of criminolo-
gists was neglected who have explained in great detail that criminals cannot
simply be defined to be enemies of the people but must rather be treated as
individuals who often have social and sometimes psychological problems.
As has been explained in my report on the Draft of the 2012 Amendments to
the Code, similar controversies existed some 100 to 200 years ago in continental
European countries20. In the old European systems criminal justice authorities
were guided solely by the inquisitorial principle. The suspect was considered
merely an object of the proceedings upon which the investigation was focused.
The suspect didn’t have any procedural rights, he or she was only expected to
make a confession. Torture was considered necessary to procure a confession and
thus discover the truth.
Beginning with the eighteenth century, Enlightenment, a philosophy of Nat-
ural Law and the introduction of individual rights in constitutional documents
have fundamentally changed the position of the suspect in the western world.
Torture was abolished, but the suspect was still required to make a confession.
The confession was considered to be the “queen of proof.” Starting with the late
nineteenth century, the privilege against self-incrimination was introduced in
European countries. In the course of the twentieth century the privilege has been
considerably expanded as a consequence of the general human rights movement.
Today, it would be considered a clear violation of human dignity to require a
suspect to incriminate himself or herself. As suspects are generally not aware of
their privilege against self-incrimination, there is general consensus in western
countries that suspects must be informed of their right not to answer questions.
Each of these reforms was accompanied by severe criticism, above all from
investigating authorities, that criminal justice administration would break down
if the suspect’s autonomy was going to be protected by the privilege against self-
incrimination. History proves, however, that such allegations were an unfounded
myth; the predicted disasters never happened. This lesson of history should be
taken to encourage the Chinese legislature when preparing future reforms in the
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19 Chen Guangzhong/Liu Mei, Reform of Criminal Evidence System in China, in: International
Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice Policy ed., Promoting Criminal Justice
Reform: A Collection of Papers from the Canada-China Cooperation Symposium, 1 ff., at 5,
Vancouver 2007.
20 See above footnote 5.
People’s Republic. As long as the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code places the
privilege next to the suspect’s duty to tell the truth, it relies on an irrational
contradiction. Harmony which is a basic requirement of Chinese criminal justice
administration can never be achieved in this way.
It must be expected that on the basis of the contradictory law Chinese police
officers will decide to continue with their standard practice of requiring the
suspect to tell the truth and simply disregard the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. As a consequence, the officers will at the beginning of interrogation inform
the suspect of his or her legal duty to make a confession. From a psychological
point of view, this will place the suspect under considerable pressure. This
pressure will be increased when the officer will, according to Article 118 (2),
inform the suspect that a confession might lead to a less severe punishment. The
suspect will likely misunderstand this information as a warning that neglecting
the legal duty to make a confession will be punished by an increase in the
sentence.
There is the additional question of whether the suspect will have a right to be
assisted by defense counsel during police interrogation. In the past, the right to
counsel started only after the first interrogation21. As was explained in my report
on the Draft, the right to defense counsel is mainly worthless if counsel is not
permitted to represent the suspect during the first interrogation22. Police will in
such case continue questioning the suspect with a variety of interrogation tactics
until they have procured a confession.
The 2012 reform tried to take care of this problem by providing in Article 33 (1)
(1) that the right to have defense counsel starts “from the day when the suspect is
interrogated… for the first time.” This seems to have considerably improved the
position of the suspect. The clause “from the day”must, however, be criticized for
ambiguity. It can be read to provide the suspect with the right to be assisted by
counsel “from the beginning of the first police interrogation.” This would be the
proper way of interpreting the clause if the right to counsel is to operate as an
effective barrier against oppressive police tactics. The clause can, however, also
be read in a different way: counsel will be admitted “at the day of the first police
interrogation but not necessarily before the first interrogation.” This would take
the teeth out of the reform because police could continue questioning the suspect
without any interference by counsel. To enforce the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation introduced by the reform, Chinese police should be forced to admit
counsel from the beginning of the first interrogation.
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22 See above footnote 5.
If counsel will be admitted in this way, there will be the next question:
whether the new Article 33 (1) (1) allows defense counsel to be present at police
interrogation or whether the suspect can only consult with counsel during this
procedural stage. This is an important distinction because police interrogation,
above all the first interrogation, must be considered a decisive stage in criminal
proceedings. Different from a common assumption, it is often not the trial but
rather police interrogation where cases are solved. Once the police have managed
to extract a confession from the suspect, “the cat will be out of the bag”, and the
case will more or less be solved. Defense counsel who may participate in the
proceedings after the first interrogation was finished will have little chance to
help. If the suspect should, on defense counsel’s advice, refuse at the trial to
repeat a wrong confession, the testimony of the investigation organ who con-
ducted the first interrogation or the record of the interrogation may be used as
evidence.
On the other hand, it remains unclear how a Chinese lawyer who would be
permitted to sit next to the suspect during police interrogation could actually
defend his or her client. As the suspect is under a legal duty to answer questions
truthfully, counsel could only try to make sure that no confession will be forced
out of the suspect. There are serious doubts whether counsel could advise the
client to remain silent.
With respect to these unsolved problems, it can only be said that the new
Article 33 (1) (1) raised considerably more questions than it answered. It should be
added that in western legal systems the privilege against self-incrimination has
been developed to provide more than a right to remain silent and to answer
questions in a way the suspect wishes. New dimensions have been added to the
privilege.
Under German law, suspects and accused must be informed of the offense of
which they are suspected before any interrogation. Suspects must further be
advised that they are free to make a statement or to remain silent, that they can
consult with defense counsel even prior to the interrogation and that they can
request exonerating evidence to be taken into consideration23. The German Feder-
al Court of Appeals held statements to be inadmissible if the suspect or accused
was not informed of the right to remain silent and to consult with counsel24. The
Court reasoned that the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized if the
required information is not given.
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24 Decisions of the Federal Court of Appeals in Criminal Matters 38 BGHSt 214 (1992); 42 BGHSt 15
(1996).
The United States Supreme Court held in the famous Miranda decision that
the privilege against self-incrimination contained in the Fifth Amendment to the
US Constitution requires a verbal warning to be given before interrogating a
suspect25. Similar to German law, the suspect must be informed of the right to
remain silent and to have counsel. Different from German law, the warnings must
include what may be considered a “declaration of war,” explaining that anything
the suspect will say may be used against him or her at the trial. Also, unlike in
Germany, the police must stop any further questioning as soon as the suspect
expresses the wish to remain silent. On the other hand, Miranda warnings must
only be given prior to “custodial interrogation,” which is an interrogation where
the suspect is not free to leave. A police officer who, for example, stops the driver
of a vehicle on the street does not need to give the warnings.
The European Court of Human Rights which functions as a transnational
watchdog of European legal systems held in Salduz v. Turkey, a landmark decision
of 2008, that under Article 6 (3) (c) of the European Convention on Human Rights
defence counsel must be provided during the first police interrogation26. Referring
to the right to a fair trial which is guaranteed by Article 6 (1) of the Convention,
the Grand Chamber of the Court indicated that “[t]he rights of the defence will in
principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made during
police interrogation without access to a lawyer are used for conviction”27. The
decision of the European Court does not legally bind other Member States of the
Council of Europe; it is, however, interesting to note that France and Belgium
have taken steps to reform their law in order to make it conform to the holding of
Salduz28.
This development of the privilege against self-incrimination proves that
western and Chinese legal systems are worlds apart. Bridging this gap would
perhaps require another major earthquake in Chinese politics. The new policy of
improving the protection of the individual, which has become visible in recent
years, will need to gain more ground.
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3. Compulsory Measures
a) Arrest and Detention – Old and New Shortcomings
The reform brought only minor changes in the law of arrest and detention. It
did, above all, not touch the principle that the prosecutor rather than the judge
decides on the arrest of the suspect. Article 37 (2) of the Chinese Constitution
and Article 78 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which was not changed by the
reform, refer to the prosecutor and alternatively to the judge to be in charge of
arrest decisions. In Chinese practice it is, however, the prosecutor who decides.
This power of the prosecutor may be traced back to Russian tradition. Peter
the Great established the procuracy as the “eyes and ears of the Tsar.” The
prosecutor was in charge not only of running the criminal justice system but also
of supervising all other government officials, including judges29. In Soviet times,
this role was reinforced by the principle of Socialist legality according to which
the prosecutor was an independent organ ensuring that the legal provisions are
strictly followed as well as policies of the government and the party be enforced.
This system was adopted by the People’s Republic. The 2001 Russian reform
significantly reduced the powers of the prosecutor, but the Chinese criminal
justice system still relies on the pervasive powers of the prosecutor. This is
explicitly stated in the introductory chapter to the Criminal Procedure Code as
well as in the Chinese Constitution30.
The Chinese system of entrusting the prosecutor with the power to decide on
arrest must be considered unique. In other countries, not only of the western
world but also of formerly Socialist Eastern Europe, including Russia, it is the
judge rather than the prosecutor who is in charge of this decision. As indicated in
my report on the Draft of the 2012 reform, there are two main reasons for placing
this power in the hands of the judge31. From a psychological point of view, it
might be difficult for the prosecutor to decide with an independent and objective
mind on the suspect’s freedom, because the prosecutor may later have to deter-
mine whether or not to bring a charge against the suspect. The prosecutor may
also have to represent the accusation at the trial of this person. In addition, there
is the modern constitutional requirement that governmental power should be
distributed among different institutions. Consequently, the judge who is not
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involved in the prosecution of the case should decide whether the suspect should
be taken into custody.
In this context, it is interesting to note that in 2012 a new chapter was added
to the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code providing that persons with mental
problems who have committed a criminal act but cannot be held responsible for it
shall be submitted to involuntary medical treatment. Under the new law, it is not
the prosecutor but the judge who decides on this measure involving an invasion
of individual freedom. The prosecutor is only authorized to file a request with the
judge that such measure be imposed32. This is certainly a step in the right
direction, so it must be asked why no similar step was taken in the area of arrest
and detention.
It could be argued, however, that Chinese law is in line with Article 9 (3) (1) of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which provides that any-
one arrested shall be brought “before a judge or other officer authorized by law to
exercise judicial power.” As there is no court enforcing the International Covenant
and no other institution offering an official interpretation of its provisions, it
cannot be said whether such argument would be valid. There is, however, a
provision in Article 5 (3) (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which
is identical to the International Covenant. The European Court of Human Rights
found in a number of cases that a prosecutor’s decision to arrest was not compa-
tible with Article 533. In the Court’s view, the prosecutor is to be considered a party
to the proceedings who, therefore, cannot be expected to be impartial when
performing a judicial function in the same case. The Court considered it sufficient
that the suspect might have doubts about the prosecutor’s impartiality.
The decisions of the European Court can, of course, not be taken as an
interpretation of the International Covenant. It would, however, in view of the
Court’s decisions, be difficult to argue that Chinese law authorizing the prosecu-
tor to decide on arrest is clearly in line with the International Covenant.
As to the rights of the arrested or detained suspect, the 2012 reform left
important questions open that need an answer. According to Article 9 (2) of the
International Covenant “the arrested shall be informed, at the time of the arrest,
of the reasons of his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against
him.” Under Article 91 of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code, the police officer
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who arrests someone must produce an arrest warrant. Article 84 of the Code
provides for the interrogation of the detainee by the police officer. It may be
assumed that both instances will offer some information to the suspect but it is
questionable whether this will always be sufficient. The European Court inter-
preted Article 5 (2) of the European Convention, which is comparable to Article 9
(2) of the International Covenant as requiring that the suspect be informed with a
degree of specificity of the essential legal and factual grounds for the deprivation
of his or her liberty34. The reason for such comprehensive information is that only
on its basis the suspect will be able to challenge the lawfulness of the arrest or
detention. As a consequence, a copy of the arrest record should be handed to the
suspect.
Article 86 (1) of the Chinese Criminal Procedure Code provides that the
prosecutor who decides on the arrest may interrogate the suspect. Interrogation is
obligatory only upon the suspect’s request. Article 9 (3) (1) of the International
Covenant requires, however, an oral hearing in all cases. A decision on the
suspect’s freedom should only be taken after the suspect had chance to face the
decision-maker explaining his or her side of the case and asking questions. Under
Article 86 (1) of the Code such chance would hardly ever exist because the
provision does not require informing the suspect of the right to request a hearing,
so the suspect will not be aware of it.
Articles 115 (1) (1) and 97 (2) of the Code authorize the suspect who is being
detained to file a petition with the judicial authority refusing to release him or her
in a case where the statutory term of the detention has expired. In addition,
Article 95 (1) provides that the suspect who is subject to a compulsory measure
can apply for its modification. As a consequence, a detained suspect who falls ill
may perhaps request to be transferred to a prison hospital.
If these provisions are understood correctly, the suspect is not entitled to file
a petition requesting to review whether the detention is justified. In other words,
the suspect has no right to request discharge because there is not sufficient
evidence that he or she has committed a crime. Under Article 161 (1), the police
are in such case required to release the suspect, but the suspect cannot bring a
corresponding motion. The Criminal Procedure Code seems to be based on the
assumption that the police know everything about the case, so no petition of the
suspect is necessary.
As explained in my report on the Draft, a right of the detained suspect to
bring a complaint requesting that the reason for arrest and detention be reviewed,
new evidence be heard and the warrant be revoked has been generally acknowl-
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edged in other legal systems35. It was first introduced as the habeas corpus right
by the Magna Charta in England in 1215 and it has been expanded ever since as a
mechanism in the hands of the suspect to enforce the protection of his or her
freedom. Today such right is considered so fundamental that it is included in the
International Covenant36.
In view of this worldwide development it remains a mystery why the revision
of the Chinese Code did not bring a general right of complaint in arrest cases.
After Article 115 (1) (3) (4) introduced a general right to bring a complaint in search
and seizure cases it would only have been consequent to have an analogous right
in arrest cases which involve a much more serious invasion of individual rights.
It has been argued that it might be too heavy a burden on criminal justice
authorities if a detained suspect could steadily bring new complaints requesting
to be released. This danger can, however, easily be avoided by providing that
complaints can only be lodged at certain intervals.
b) Confinement at a Designated Residence – A New Type of Police Custody
Under the old law, residential confinement could only be executed at the sus-
pect’s residence; it was a compulsory measure to avoid arrest and detention. The
2012 reform has created a new kind of residential confinement that must be
considered the consequence of a major political earthquake, which considerably
increased the power of the police. Article 73 (1) (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code
now provides that residential confinement can in numerous cases be executed at
a “designated residence” if holding the suspect at his or her own residence would
obstruct investigation. The “designated residence” may be any location selected
by the police as long as it is not a place where suspects are kept in custody.
This new type of residential confinement is restricted to cases involving
crimes endangering national security, terrorist activities and extraordinarily ser-
ious bribery. The term “endangering national security” seems to be rather vague,
so it will allow all kinds of different interpretations, especially during political
campaigns to “crack down on crime.” As indicated above there are doubts about
whether such restriction will have a visible limiting effect37.
The new clause was met with approval because it might work to replace the
extra-legal residential detention that so far has been used by the police in day-to-
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day practice38. While the police are obviously free to hold a suspect under extra-
legal detention for as long as they wish, Article 77 sets a time limit of six months
for the detention. In view of this it can only be hoped that the extra-legal
detention will no longer be tolerated.
At the same time, confinement at a designated residence deserves severe
criticism because it introduces a compulsory measure that does not seem neces-
sary in addition to arrest and detention. The purpose of the detention at a
designated residence can only be to place the suspect under exclusive control of
the police. Its proper name would, therefore, be “police custody.” Experience
teaches that the “designated” residence is a secret residence known only to the
police. Unlike in arrest and detention cases, the police rather than the prosecutor
decide whether the suspect should be held at a designated residence. Article 73
(4) entrusts the prosecutor with a power to exercise control, but this still leaves
the original decision on the detention in the hands of the police.
Under Article 83 (2) (1), a detained person must immediately be transferred to
a jail. The reason of this provision, which was introduced by the 2012 reform, is to
reduce the possibility that the suspect might be ill-treated by the arresting police
officer who cannot always be under strict supervision. At the jail, the danger of
abuse seems reduced because there is a general system of control. It is an open
question whether a similar system of supervising and controlling individual
police officers exists at designated residences.
Article 73 (2) requires notification of the family when the suspect is held at a
designated residence, but the provision does not state that the police must
reveal where the designated residence is located. Under the provision, nothing
needs to be done in cases where notification is “impossible.” This vague clause
leaves the police with wide and uncontrolled discretion to decide whether or not
to notify the family.
Article 76 provides that communications of suspects held in residential
confinement may be monitored. It remains unclear whether this also applies to
communications between the suspect and defence counsel. According to Ar-
ticle 37 (4) (1) a meeting of counsel with the suspect who is held in custody
shall not be monitored. However, under the terminology of the Criminal Proce-
dure Code, residential confinement cannot be deemed to be a case of custody.
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From a comparative law point of view, it can only be stated that something
similar to an official police confinement in a designated residence is not found in
any of the other major legal systems.
4. Police Discretion –Wide and Uncontrolled
As in the Chinese criminal justice system the police are institutionally indepen-
dent from the other criminal justice authorities, neither the prosecutor nor the
judge can control what the police do in the course of their investigations. A rare
exception is the law on arrest and detention of the suspect where the prosecutor
rather than the police decides. There are, however, hardly any provisions in the
Criminal Procedure Code guiding or restricting the police in the exercise of their
discretion. Typical examples are the aforementioned provisions on search, sei-
zure, technical investigation measures and confinement at a designated resi-
dence39.
Also decisions as to investigation strategies are mainly left to the discretion of
the police. Articles 107 and 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code require the police
to start investigations when they discover that a crime was committed; Article 161
provides for the dismissal of a case if the police come to the conclusion that the
suspect has not committed a crime. The Code does, however, not address the
important question whether and to what extent the police will have discretion to
dismiss a case for other reasons. It is left open whether the police will, without
exception, have to transfer every case to the prosecutor when they are of the
opinion there might be sufficient evidence for conviction.
Another problem exists as to minor offences. Article 13 of the Chinese Penal
Code provides that an act of minor importance which caused little harm is not to
be considered a crime. Under Article 173 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code, the
prosecutor is authorized in such cases to terminate proceedings. There is, how-
ever, no provision in the Code stating whether the police have a similar right to
drop cases. It must be expected that without such provision and without any
other outside control Chinese police will feel authorized to decide on their own
when and to what extent to conduct investigations and when to drop which case.
There is danger that this will cause unequal law enforcement, abuse and even
corruption.
As can only be briefly mentioned here, criminal justice systems today ordina-
rily follow the principle that discretion of the police must be limited and guided
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by legal rules as well as supervised by outside institutions. If provisions on
restrictions of this kind are not included in the criminal procedure code, neces-
sary control of the police must be provided by other laws, court decisions or
measures of inner-office and disciplinary supervision.
III. Concluding Remarks
Reforming a criminal procedure code may be an important step towards improv-
ing a criminal justice system. It must, however, be noted that such reform can
never be more than one step on a long road that will require many additional
steps to be taken. This is also true as to the 2012 reform of the Chinese Criminal
Procedure Code. As this article has tried to explain, the 2012 reform was an
important step forward but there were, at the same time, visible steps backward.
The 2012 reform also omitted necessary steps that should have been taken. In
view of the rapidly developing political and social life in the People’s Republic
there is hope that further earthquakes will occur in a not so distant future which
will bring new reforms and, above all, develop new ways of balancing efficient
law enforcement with a further improvement of the protection of individual
rights.
The 2012 reform did not reach its final goal when the revised Criminal
Procedure Code became effective on January 1, 2013. Courts will have to take
every occasion to explain what is meant by individual provisions of the new law.
In addition, institutions in charge of criminal justice administration should issue
guidelines that will fill the gaps left by the Code. Last but not least, training
programs will have to be instituted, so personnel involved in criminal justice
administration, above all police officers, will learn how to work not only with the
letters but also with the spirit of the reformed law. Only with the help of such
combined efforts will it be possible to enforce the new law in a harmonious way.
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